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Sex dating in bingham new mexico

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The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court because it presented a significant question of law under the New Mexico Constitution. Based on the independent grounds provided by the Equal Rights Amendment to Article II, Section 18 of our state constitution, we affirm the district court's order. Except in cases of rape or incest, or when necessary to save the life of the mother, abortions are among the medical services for which federal funding is unavailable under a provision of federal law known as “the Hyde Amendment.” See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub.

2868, and a close relation to the Medicaid-eligible women whose rights they seek to assert in court, see id. On April 21, 1995, however, Plaintiffs brought suit in the district court to prevent the 1995 revision of Rule 766 from taking effect. Klecan filed a motion, in which Donald Schaurete later joined, to intervene as of right as a taxpayer and representative of the potential life of the unborn. Following the trend in federal standing law articulated in Sierra Club v. Stout, Albuquerque, for Appellees and Cross-Appellants. Paul Benjamin Linton, Acting General Counsel, Americans United for Life, Chicago, IL, for Amici Curiae Senator Duncan Scott, Representative Frank Bird, and Other Members of the New Mexico Legislature. Abegg, Terre Haute, IN, for Amicus Curiae Right to Life Committee of New Mexico. Under the district court's order, the Department must allow the use of state funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid-eligible women when they are medically necessary. However, “[a] participating State is free, if it so chooses, to include in its Medicaid plan those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable.” Harris, 448 U. Under the court's order, an abortion is “medically necessary” when a pregnancy aggravates a pre-existing condition, makes treatment of a condition impossible, interferes with or hampers a diagnosis, or has a profound negative impact upon the physical or mental health of an individual. Both Plaintiffs and the Department subsequently filed motions for summary judgment and entered stipulations of fact.

On May 1, 1995, the district court granted a preliminary injunction to keep the 1995 revision of Rule 766 from taking effect.

On this basis, the district court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and made the injunction permanent. On October 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals certified the appeals to this Court. The parties raise several threshold questions that we must answer before turning to the merits of the district court's ruling. Plaintiff Abortion and Reproductive Health Services is a non-profit organization that also provides such services.

On July 3, 1995, the district court issued a memorandum opinion concluding that the 1995 revision of Rule 766 violates Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the orders allowing Klecan and Schaurete to intervene. D., are individual physicians who provide reproductive health care services, including abortions, to Medicaid-eligible women.

Rule 1-024(A)(2) requires a person claiming a right of intervention to demonstrate an interest in the action “that is significant, direct rather than contingent, and based on a right belonging to the proposed intervenor rather than [to] an existing party to the suit.” Cordova v.

Insofar as Plaintiff New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL seeks to assert the rights of its members who are Medicaid-eligible women, this organization also has a sufficiently direct interest and a sufficiently close relationship. Thus, we must determine whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in granting the motion to intervene under Rule 1-024(A)(2). We agree with Plaintiffs that Klecan and Schaurete fail to meet the requirements of Rule 1-024(A)(2).

640, 954 P.2d 72 (noting prerequisites of “actual controversy” in declaratory judgment actions).